Do you have a post-quantum secure-boot requirement from the looming CNSA 2.0 timeline? The timeline has stated that post-quantum signature schemes should be used exclusively by 2030, and adoption should begin immediately. To this end, a few months ago we hinted that plans were underway for post-quantum wolfBoot support, and just recently we added post-quantum LMS/HSS signatures to wolfCrypt.
Building on this, we are excited to announce we have added support for LMS/HSS post-quantum signatures to wolfBoot. LMS wolfBoot support includes keygen, signing, verifying, and importing public keys generated from e.g. an HSM. In fact, to demonstrate HSM interoperability, we recently tested an LMS firmware signature verification integration with Crypto4A’s QxEdge HSM, and showed a live demo at ICMC 2023! If you’re curious, you can read more about our support in our recently added wolfBoot PQ docs, and LMS example config. It describes the LMS/HSS parameters we support from RFC 8554, and the performance tuning and space/time tradeoffs they enable.
LMS/HSS is an example of a post-quantum stateful hash-based signature (HBS) scheme. The security of these signature schemes is based simply on their underlying hash functions and Merkle trees, and does not rely on the assumed mathematical hardness of, for example, prime factorization. This feature gives stateful HBS schemes time tested, tried and true post-quantum security, which is why they have been recommended by NIST SP 800-208 and the NSA’s CNSA 2.0 suite.
An astute reader might notice that both LMS/HSS and XMSS/XMSS^MT were recommended in NIST SP 800-208 and the NSA’s CNSA 2.0 suite. Should we add XMSS/XMSS^MT to wolfBoot as well? Let us know what you think.
Download wolfSSL Now